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Abstract 
Is the nested sets approach to improving accuracy on Bayesian 
word problems simply a way of prompting a natural 
frequencies solution, as its critics claim? Conversely, is it in 
fact, as its advocates claim, a more fundamental explanation of 
why the natural frequency approach itself works? Following 
recent calls, we use a process-focused approach to contribute 
to answering these long-debated questions. We also argue for 
a third, pragmatic way of looking at these two approaches and 
argue that they reveal different truths about human Bayesian 
reasoning. Using a think aloud methodology we show that 
while the nested sets approach does appear in part to work via 
the mechanisms theorised by advocates (by encouraging a 
nested sets representation), it also encourages conversion of the 
problem to frequencies, as its critics claim. The ramifications 
of these findings, as well as ways to further enhance the nested 
sets approach and train individuals to deal with standard 
probability problems are discussed. 
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A recent meta-analysis (McDowell & Jacobs, 2017) 
conclusively demonstrated that when a Bayesian word 
problem is presented according to natural frequency (NF) 
principles, normative responding increases relative to the 
‘standard probability’ format (SP), with an average accuracy 
of around 24%. Both versions of the classic medical 
diagnosis problem can be seen below (statistical notation 
added). 
 
Standard probability format (individual chance): The chance 
of breast cancer is 1% [P(Ca)] for women at age forty who 
participate in routine screening. If a woman has breast cancer, the 
chance is 80% [P(Po|Ca)] that she will get a positive mammography. 
If a woman does not have breast cancer, the chance is 9.6% 
[P(Po|¬Ca)] that she will also get a positive mammography. A 
woman in this age group had a positive mammography in routine 
screening. What is the chance that she actually has breast cancer 
[P(Ca|Po)]? ____% 
 
Natural frequencies: 10 [F(Ca)] out of 1000 women at age forty 
who participate in routine screening have breast cancer. Out of the 
10 women with breast cancer, 8 [F(Po&Ca)] will get a positive 
mammography. 95 [F(Po&¬Ca)] out of every 990 women without 
breast cancer will also get a positive mammography. Here is a new 
representative sample of women at age forty who got a positive 
mammography in routine screening. What proportion of these 
women do you expect to actually have breast cancer [P(Ca|Po)]? ___ 
% 
                                                          
1 In fact, in some natural frequency versions, the final question is: 
‘How many of these women do you expect to actually have breast 
 
We can see several differences between these 
formats. Most obviously, the NF format uses frequencies 
(indicated by the ‘F’ notation) rather than percentages / 
probabilities (P), but more importantly, the figures are not 
normalized. In the SP format, the figures are normalized by 
the use of a standard denominator (percentages are one way 
of achieving this with a hidden denominator of 100, but 
normalized frequencies with other denominators are also 
possible). This difference in normalization firstly has a 
known effect on the number of computations required to 
solve each problem. In an NF format there are thought to be 
only two computational steps1: (1) summing the number of 
individuals with a positive result and cancer F(Po&Ca) with 
the number of individuals with a positive result but no cancer 
F(Po&¬Ca) and then (2) dividing F(Po&Ca) by this sum. The 
same formula can be used if those same numbers are given in 
percentage or probability format. 
 
𝐹(𝑃𝑜&𝐶𝑎)
𝐹(𝑃𝑜&𝐶𝑎) + 𝐹(𝑃𝑜&¬𝐶𝑎)
 𝑜𝑟
𝑃(𝑃𝑜&𝐶𝑎)
𝑃(𝑃𝑜&𝐶𝑎) + 𝑃(𝑃𝑜&¬𝐶𝑎)
 
  
However, normalized formats require an additional 
pre-step (you won’t see any of these figures in the standard 
probability format to the left). P(Po&Ca) must itself first be 
calculated by multiplying the proportion of individuals with 
cancer who get a positive result (P[Po|Ca]) with the total 
proportion of individuals with cancer P(Ca). Similarly, 
P(Po&¬Ca) must be calculated by multiplying P(Po|¬Ca) 
with P(¬Ca). For example, to calculate the proportion of 
women without breast cancer and a positive result, we 
multiply the percentage of women without breast cancer 
(99%) by the percentage of those women who get a positive 
result (9.6%). This may be a trivial calculation for most, but 
crucially, the solver first has to have an accurate 
representation of the problem in order to know that we (A) 
need to calculate this figure to solve the problem and (B) 
should multiply these two particular values rather than using 
some other figures or operation to compute it.  
As has been noted, in the natural frequency format, 
this figure is provided for us, which has widely been accepted 
as a potential confound by subverting the need for (A) 
entirely (however see Brase & Hill, 2015 for work suggesting 
this may not be an important factor). However, NF 
cancer? ___ out of ___’ This reduces the computational steps 
further, to one only: calculating the total positives. 
proponents (e.g. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995) tell the story 
the other way around: normalization is an artificial (and 
relatively recent) human construct which transforms 
problems from a natural and solvable format to an unnatural 
and difficult one. These authors propose that normalization 
adds an additional difficulty by changing the structure of the 
information from that which would be obtained through 
‘natural sampling’ i.e. if we observed 1000 women one by 
one, taking note in each case whether they had cancer and 
whether they got a positive result. This information structure 
of the natural frequency format is thought to replicate the 
natural format that human beings experience in the world, 
and thus are predisposed in some way to work with, which is 
the true reason for the increased normative responding 
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). 
One concrete change however is that when 
information is presented in this way, the denominator of 
F(Po&¬Ca) (990) matches F(¬Ca). Other authors (e.g. 
Evans, Handley, Perham, Over & Thompson, 2000; Sloman, 
Over, Slovak & Stibel, 2003) have therefore claimed that 
rather than this having anything to do with ‘natural’ formats, 
this simply makes the ‘nested sets’ structure of the problem 
transparent (e.g. that women with a positive mammography 
but no breast cancer are a subset of the larger group of women 
without breast cancer). Nested sets advocates argue that this 
set structure revelation should be considered the more 
ultimate cause. They have sought to demonstrate that any 
method which reveals the nested sets structure of the problem 
will be equally successful. One example, using normalized 
percentages for the false positive and negative rates like the 
SP format but framing these in terms of proportions of groups 
(PP) rather than individual chance (an approach developed by 
Macchi [2000]), can be seen below: 
 
Nested Sets (Proportion Percentages): 10 F[Ca] out of 1000 
women at age forty who participate in routine screening have breast 
cancer. Out of the women with breast cancer, 80% [P(Po|¬Ca)] will 
get a positive mammography. Out of those women without breast 
cancer, 9.6% [P(Po|¬Ca)] will also get a positive mammography. 
Here is a new representative sample of women at age forty who got 
a positive mammography in routine screening. What proportion of 
these women do you expect to actually have breast cancer 
[P(Ca|Po)]? ___ % 
 
Macchi (2000) found an improvement in accuracy 
compared to an SP format, and no significant difference to an 
NF format. Following this and similar papers, NF proponents 
(Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss & Martignon, 2002) have 
argued that nested sets formats simply encourage solvers to 
construct an NF version of the problem for themselves, which 
is the ultimate reason for increased accuracy. This criticism 
seems all the more plausible for Macchi’s format, given that 
unlike the standard probability format, it presented the base 
rate as a frequency. It is important to note however that 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) originally theorized based 
on evolutionary grounds that the phenomena of neglecting 
base rates (P[Ca] and P[¬Ca]) during solution should 
generalize to non-NF formats because that information is not 
required for solution in an NF format, which people are 
adapted to: 
 
“Base rate information need not be attended to in 
frequency formats (Result 3). If our evolutionary argument 
that cognitive algorithms were designed for frequency 
information acquired through natural sampling is valid, then 
base rate neglect may come naturally when generalizing to 
other information representations, such as the standard 
probability format (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, pp. 29) 
 
While the authors refer specifically to the standard 
probability format here, the key point is that in evolutionary 
history humans have never had to complete the ‘pre-step’ 
required in the normalized format, because information has 
always been presented to them in the natural frequency 
format (and in which they can compute the normative answer 
without using the base rates), and so they may lack the 
capacity to do this, regardless of whether that normalized 
format is presented in the SP way, or in Macchi’s PP way. 
The simple fact that nested sets results defy this has been 
widely overlooked in the field, and in fact suggests a potential 
harmony between the two approaches, rather than a discord, 
at least at the pragmatic level. While people do indeed seem 
more capable of solving a Bayesian word problem in a natural 
frequency format, than in a standard normalized format, 
nested sets results show us that, with the right framing, people 
can solve normalized Bayesian problems too.  
A preliminary aim of this paper is to replicate 
Macchi’s approach, as it has only been demonstrated in a 
single experiment. Furthermore, it needs replication in a 
wider range of more ecologically valid situations, including 
with the base rate presented as a percentage (as mentioned, 
Macchi’s original format used a frequency base rate unlike 
the SP format) and with non-whole numbers. These factors 
may be present in real-world contexts and may add sufficient 
complexity to undermine the value of the format. We also aim 
to test the format in both simple (all women with breast 
cancer get a positive result) and hard (some women with 
breast cancer get a false negative) problems as both versions 
have been used widely in the literature.  
A more ambitious aim of this paper is to assist in 
settling the highly debated connection between nested sets 
and natural frequency formats. Over the past few years 
repeated calls have been made to resolve these differences 
between the two camps (Brase & Hill, 2015; McNair, 2015; 
Johnson & Tubau, 2015; McDowell & Jacobs, 2017). Given 
that these are fundamental questions about cognitive process, 
the same authors have repeatedly called for more process-
focused experiments. While two previous experiments 
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995; Macchi, 2000) used a ‘think 
aloud’ (TA) approach (where participants record their 
thought processes while solving the problem) in both cases 
this was only used to report the types of errors participants 
make. We aim to make greater use of this data to shed light 
on the following questions. Does the nested sets approach 
work, as claimed by its advocates, by encouraging a 
representation of e.g. P(Po&¬Ca) as a subset of P(¬Ca) at the 
first, de-normalization step? Does the nested sets approach 
encourage individuals to construct a natural frequency 
representation for themselves, as claimed by Hoffrage et al. 
(2002)? Which of these are predictive of success on the 
problem? Finally, what else can we learn about the 
mechanisms by which Macchi’s nested sets approach 
achieves greater accuracy? 
 
Method 
521 participants were recruited through Amazon 
MTurk (55.3% female; mean age = 34.2 [SD = 11.6]). The 
experiment had eight between-subjects conditions, using a 2 
(standard probability [SP] vs proportion percentages [PP]) x 
2 (simple vs hard) x 2 (whole vs decimal) design. The PP-
hard-decimal condition can be seen below (with statistical 
notation, not shown to participants), and further materials and 
experimental data are available at https://osf.io/nd46g/. This 
is considered a decimal version because the product of 
computational step 1 (e.g. 10% x 76% = 7.6%) is a non-whole 
number. 
 
Every year the government advises women to take part in routine 
mammography screening using an X-ray machine to determine if 
they have breast cancer. Among women at age forty who participte 
in this routine screening 10% [P(Ca)] have breast cancer, while 
90% [P(¬Ca)] do not. However, the screening test is not always 
accurate. Specifically, out of those women who have breast cancer, 
only 76% [P(Po|Ca)] will actually get a positive mammography. 
Furthermore, out of all of those women who do not have breast 
cancer, 15% [P(Po|¬Ca)] will also get a positive mammography. 
What percentage of women at age forty who get a positive 
mammography [P(Po)] in routine screening actually have breast 
cancer[P(Ca|Po)]? ___% 
 
Participants were also required to record their 
thought process in an open text box. They could only submit 
their numerical response after they had submitted their 
thought process. All qualitative analysis of the TA data was 
undertaken blind to condition. Analysis was coded by two 
authors separately, with over 90% agreement. Discrepancies 
were resolved through the decision of a third coder. 
Participants were given a ‘normative’ label if their 
numerical response was within 1% of the Bayesian normative 
value. Beyond this however, we found seven participants 
who clearly demonstrated accurate reasoning, including all 
necessary computational steps, but made an arithmetic error. 
These participants were also labelled as normative. One of 
these participants was in the nested sets conditions, while six 
were in the standard probability conditions. 
 
Results 
General Results 
The overall proportion of the sample providing the normative 
response for the experiment was 13.5% with an average of 
9.0% for the SP conditions and 18.1% for the PP conditions. 
In Figure 1, normative proportions for all eight conditions can 
be seen. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The percentage of participants providing the 
normative Bayesian answers across all eight conditions. Error 
bars represent one standard error. 
 
A binary logistic regression (BLR) using ‘normative 
response’ as the dependent variable and the three condition-
comparisons (SP vs PP; whole vs decimal; simple vs hard) as 
independent variables found a main effect for the SP-PP 
comparison (Wald Χ2 = 8.984, p=.003), no main effect for the 
whole-decimal comparison (Wald Χ2 = .184, p=.668) and no 
main effect for the simple-hard comparison (Wald Χ2 = 
1.350, p=.245). All subsequent analyses on ‘condition’ 
therefore compare SP to PP only. 
 
Nested Sets Representation 
Across all conditions, 87 (16.7%) individuals expressed a 
‘nested sets representation’ of the problem. For this 
classification, participants had to explicitly, in words, depict 
the group of individuals who had both a positive test result 
but not cancer (P[Po&¬Ca]) as a subset of the total 
individuals without cancer (P[¬Ca]). In the hard condition, 
they also had to express the group of individuals who had a 
positive result and cancer (P[Po&Ca]) as a subset of the 
individuals with cancer (P[Ca]). A mathematical formula was 
not sufficient to be assigned this code. An example comes 
from P261 who stated, “Of the 90% who do not have cancer, 
15% will get a positive mammography”. Here we can see a 
word-based representation of the individuals who do not have 
cancer but got a positive test result as a subset of those who 
do not have cancer. This classification was applied 
conservatively. For example, P498 who said “First what is 
15% of 90%, that is 13.5%” did not receive the classification. 
An example from the hard condition which did get this 
classification comes from P138 who said “We know 10% of 
women will have breast cancer in the screen and 80% of those 
will show up positive […] Of the remaining 90 women who 
do not have breast cancer 10% will be given a false positive 
so an additional 9 women.” 
A BLR showed that this representation was 
unsurprisingly more common within the PP (24.0%) 
condition, which expressed the problem in this format, than 
in the SP (9.7%) condition (Wald Χ2 = 18.0, p<.001), which 
used an individual chance format. However clearly some 
individuals in the SP condition re-represented the problem in 
terms of nested sets. Furthermore, in both conditions, this 
representation was highly associated with normativity, as can 
be seen in Table 1. 
A BLR was run with normativity as DV, and 
condition and NS-representation as IV’s, and a unique 
predictive effect of NS-representation (Wald Χ2 = 123.6, 
p<.001) was found, but no unique effect of condition (Wald 
Χ2 = 0.04, p=0.837). 
 
Conversion to frequencies 
Across all conditions, 87 participants (16.7%) 
also converted the base rate in the problem from a 
percentage into a frequency before attempting solution 
(i.e. before providing an NS-representation or completing 
the first computational step). For this classification, a 
‘sample’ or ‘population’ of individuals as a frequency 
rather than a percentage or probability had to be expressed. 
For example, P105 said ‘To make my math easier, I am 
going to assume there are 100 women.’ and P186 began 
‘Out of 100 women, 10 have breast cancer, while 90 do 
not.’ Out of the 87 participants who converted the problem 
to whole numbers, 73 converted to a population of 100 
women. The number of individuals who made this 
conversion in each condition, crossed with those providing 
the NS-representation and the proportion of these 
subgroups providing the normative response can be seen 
in Table 1. A BLR with conversion as DV and condition 
as IV showed a predictive effect (Wald Χ2 = 7.3, p=.007). 
A BLR with normative response as DV and condition and 
conversion as IV’s showed a unique effect of conversion 
(Wald Χ2 = 128.9, p<.001) and a potential unique effect of 
condition (Wald Χ2 = 5.2, p = 0.041). 
To simultaneously test the impact of condition, NS-
representation and conversion upon normativity, a BLR was 
run. No main effect of condition was seen (Wald Χ2 = 0.172, 
p=0.68), but a unique effect of NS-representation (Wald Χ2 = 
93.2, p<.001) and of conversion (Wald Χ2 = 8.3, p=0.004) 
was seen. A table depicting these relationships can be seen 
below. 
 
Table 1. Percentage of individuals providing the normative 
answer organized by condition, NS-representation and 
conversion (total number of individuals in each subgroup 
regardless of normativity in parentheses). 
 
 Standard Probability Proportion Percent 
 No NS-
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Total No 
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1.4 
(221) 
69.2 
(13) 
5.1 
(234) 
2.8 
(176) 
45.8 
(24) 
8.0 
(200) 
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5.0 
(20) 
84.6 
(13) 
36.4 
(33) 
5.9 
(17) 
78.4 
(37) 
55.6 
(54) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
T
o
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l 
1.7 
(241) 
76.9 
(26) 
(267) 
3.1 
(193) 
65.6 
(61) 
(254) 
 
From the raw data, we can see that in the absence of 
the NS-representation, conversion only appears to be 
associated with a small (~3%) increase in normativity, while 
in the presence of the NS-representation, converting appears 
to be associated with a much larger (~15-30%) increase. To 
check this, we ran two BLR’s, predicting normativity from 
conversion. Within those who did not produce an NS-
representation, no predictive relationship was seen (Wald Χ2 
= 0.81, p=0.21) while within those who did produce an NS-
representation, a predictive relationship was seen (Wald Χ2 = 
6.4, p=0.011). Dependency of this sort was not seen for the 
NS-representation, which was a significant predictor of 
normativity among those who did not convert (Wald Χ2 = 
69.3 p<.001) as well as those who converted (Wald Χ2 = 27.6, 
p<.001). For some individuals their process could not be 
determined (e.g. if they just provided a mathematical 
formula) but a few individuals were able to solve the problem 
without converting and also while apparently using a chance 
representation, such as P40: 
 
“There is a 10% chance that any woman over 40 has breast 
cancer [and] there is a 10% chance that a woman who does not have 
breast cancer over 40 gets a positive result. This means there is a 
9% chance of [a false positive] and a 19% chance that someone 
tests positive for breast cancer. Out of this there is a 10/19% chance 
that the diagnosis is correct meaning there is a 52.63% chance.” 
 
Errors 
The most common error within the SP condition 
(21.7%) was to provide the complement of the false 
positive rate, (1-P[Po|¬Ca]). This was much less common 
within the PP condition (5.5%). The TA data was coded 
for insight into common reasoning and a single piece of 
reasoning was highly prominent (45.8% of cases). This 
was the confusion of P(Po|¬Ca) with P(¬Ca|Po). 
Following this confusion, the subsequent accurate 
deduction was made that 100% minus this value would 
give P(Ca|Po). For example, P228 said ‘The fact that 15% 
of positive mammographies are invalid means that 85% 
are valid. She therefore has an 85% chance of actually 
having breast cancer’, P20 said ‘I guess since 10% of 
positive tests are inaccurate, that means there’s a 90% 
chance of her having cancer’ and P133 said ‘Also of all 
the women who get a positive mammogram, 15% will not 
have breast cancer, so I think it is 85%.’ Each of these 
participants use language reflecting P(¬Ca|Po) but 
accompanying the percentage value representing 
P(Po|¬Ca), strongly suggesting a confusion between the 
two. P177 expressed this confusion more explicitly, saying 
‘But there is a 10 percent chance that a woman without 
breast cancer will get a positive mammogram [true, 
P(Po|¬Ca)], so 10 percent of the positive mammograms 
are not accurate [false, P(¬Ca|Po)]’. In the remainder of 
these participants’ TA data, the reasoning could not be 
extracted from the data. For example, many participants 
simply provided mathematical notation. 
 
Computational Steps 
A cumulative graph depicting the proportion of individuals 
reporting each of the three computational steps, step 1 the 
calculation of P(Po&Ca) and P(Po&¬Ca), step 2 the 
summing of these and step 3 the division of P(Po&Ca) by the 
sum as well as whether the participant provided the normative 
numerical value can be seen below for both conditions. For 
both conditions, the majority of individuals do not achieve 
step 1, with further substantial but smaller drop-off between 
this and step 2, and no substantial subsequent drop-off 
between these and step 3 or the normative response. In short, 
highly similar curves were seen for both the SP and PP 
conditions. The major difference between the two conditions 
was the number of individuals reporting step 1 (with more 
individuals reporting this in the PP condition). Similar 
proportional drop-off was subsequently seen in both 
conditions. Indeed, while condition was predictive of step 1 
(Wald Χ2 = 15.3, p<.001), when controlling for step 1, 
condition was not predictive of step 2 (Wald Χ2 = 0.19, 
p=.891), step 3 (Wald Χ2 = .988, p=.320) or the normative 
response (Wald Χ2 = 0.076, p=.783). 
 
 
Figure 2. Drop-off graph for each computational step. Error 
bars represent one standard error. 
 
Discussion 
We replicated Macchi’s (2000) finding in a larger 
sample, and across a range of different format types, 
including with percentage base rates with and without the 
possibility of false negatives and with whole numbers and 
non-whole numbers. In each case, Macchi’s proportion 
percentage format improved normativity over and above the 
SP format, with an overall increase from 9.0% to 18.1%. 
We found that normativity is highly associated with 
the individual reporting a representation of P(Po&¬Ca) as a 
subset of P(¬Ca) in their think aloud data, and in the hard 
condition, also P(Po&Ca) as a subset of P(Ca). This finding 
is not surprising within the proportion percentage group, as it 
could be argued that these individuals are simply 
regurgitating the text from the problem. However, crucially, 
this relationship also held within the standard probability 
format, where an ‘individual chance’ probability format (i.e. 
‘If a woman has cancer, her chance of …) was presented. This 
observational finding should also be considered in the context 
of previous experiments (e.g. Evans et al, 2000; Sloman et al, 
2003) showing that attempts to assist individuals in creating 
exactly this representation of the problem have been 
successful in increasing accuracy. Here we show that some 
individuals, without any prompt to do this, spontaneously 
adopt this representation, and this correlates highly with 
normativity. We also found some evidence that the NS-
representation may have a mediating effect on the impact of 
the NS format. This provides some complementary evidence 
to those papers that the mechanism by which nested sets 
formats achieve greater accuracy is at least partially that 
which they have espoused: by encouraging a nested sets 
representation of the structure of the problem. 
We also found that many individuals make a further 
spontaneous re-representation of the problem, and that this 
also correlates highly with normativity. This is the 
conversion of the problem from a percentage format into a 
frequency format. Interestingly, conversion alone seemed not 
to be predictive of normativity, however in combination with 
the NS-representation it was associated with higher rates of 
normativity than the NS-representation alone. The same was 
not true of the NS-representation. This was still highly 
predictive of normativity with or without conversion. 
Importantly, the majority of individuals who converted did so 
to a base of 100, making no mathematical change to the 
problem. This therefore seems to demonstrate a preference 
among our sample for working with frequency values over 
percentages, even when the absolute numbers (e.g. 20% vs 
20 women out of 100) and therefore calculations, are 
identical. Of course, we cannot resolve the ultimate reason 
for this, be that a greater evolutionary exposure towards 
frequencies or a current greater exposure to frequencies 
during our participants’ lives. We tentatively suggest a third 
possibility. It may be difficult to mentally represent a 
percentage, abstract as it is, without it being a percentage of 
something tangible. Imagining 100 women may simply 
provide a concrete mental image which can be divided and 
sub-divided according to the percentages. It may also provide 
a platform for a simple internal narrative about these women 
and what happens to them. Whatever the ultimate reason 
however, this result does partially confirm Hoffrage et al’s 
(2002) conjecture. 
These findings have some relevance to the question 
of whether the elements that are thought to comprise the 
natural frequency format are separable, and if so, which 
elements are doing the ‘work’ in improving accuracy. Nested 
sets advocates have argued that the nested sets structure is 
doing all the work, and the frequencies are superfluous. 
Natural frequency advocates have argued that the two are 
inseparable. Here we find some tentative evidence that the 
two are separable (individuals who form a nested sets 
representation but do not convert to frequencies are still more 
successful than those who do not form that representation). 
However, even if separable, both the nested sets structure, 
and the use of frequencies (as opposed to percentages) appear 
to uniquely contribute to success, with the combination of 
both being more strongly associated with success than either 
alone. Importantly, without the nested sets structure, 
conversion to frequencies did not predict success, which may 
mirror findings that normalized frequency formats are no 
better than the standard probability format (e.g. Evans et al., 
2000). 
In terms of further investigation into the 
mechanisms of Macchi’s nested sets format, we presented 
evidence that relative to the SP format, more individuals 
achieve step 1 (de-normalization). However, controlling for 
this, the proportion of participants achieving subsequent steps 
is not different to the SP format. Related to this, an analysis 
of errors between conditions has shown that the classic 1-
P(Po|¬Ca) error was drastically reduced from 21.7% of total 
responses in the SP format to 5.5% in the PP format. This 
error, in line with previous theorizing (e.g. Braine and 
Connell, 1990) has been found here to principally stem from 
a confusion between the false positive rate P(Po|¬Ca) and 
P(¬Ca|Po). As has been mentioned, the clarification of the 
false positive rate (and the true positive rate in the hard 
condition) by encouraging individuals to see it as a subset of 
P(¬Ca) has long been theorized to be the mechanism by 
which nested sets formats work. The reduction of this error 
in the PP condition therefore seems to further support this 
theory. Given that the false positive rate is required for step 
1, it also provides further evidence that the impact of 
Macchi’s format is principally achieved at this step. 
As noted, Macchi’s format does not appear, upon 
the current evidence, to provide any additional support in the 
later stages of solution, most notably in getting from 
computational step 1 to step 2. At this step individuals need 
to recognize (A) that they require the total number of positive 
results, and (B) that they need to combine the false positives 
with the true positives to achieve this. So far, research has 
been principally focused on helping solvers form a 
representation of e.g. P(Po&¬Ca) as a subset of P(¬Ca). 
However, success on the final two steps may instead be a 
product of recognizing a different set relation, that of 
P(Ca&Po) and P(¬Ca&Po) as subsets of P(Po). We can 
clarify this distinction by displaying two tree structures of the 
medical diagnosis problem below. The top shows the classic 
structure, widely published, with the hypothesis, ‘Cancer’ as 
the first ‘division’, or first set of child nodes. However, the 
opposite structure is also possible, shown at the bottom, with 
the data, ‘Positive’ as the first set of child nodes. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. ‘Hypothesis First’ and ‘Data First’ tree diagram 
representations of the medical diagnosis problem. 
 
While perceiving the set relations in the hypothesis-
first version seems key to step 1, steps 2 (calculating total 
positives) and 3 (dividing cancer & positive by total 
positives) would seem to require an understanding of the set 
relations in (at least the left half) of the data-first diagram. For 
step 2, the addition, one must understand that P(Ca&Po) and 
P(¬Ca&Po) are subsets of P(Po). It seems to us that step 3, 
the division, should require only that same set relation i.e. that 
P(Ca&Po) is a subset of P(Po). To our knowledge this 
distinction has not been made before. We believe that in order 
to improve framing methods further, focus should be on 
helping individuals form these latter set representations at the 
most appropriate time to facilitate steps 2 and 3. 
In the medical diagnosis problem, the information 
related to steps 2 and 3 are contained within the question. In 
our nested sets format, this is changed into a proportion form 
i.e. ‘What percentage of women at age forty who get a 
positive mammography…’, unlike the SP format, which is 
chance framed. While plausibly this could have helped 
solvers form exactly this latter subset representation, the 
current evidence suggests this did not have an impact. Future 
work may look to combine Macchi’s format with a question 
form used by Girotto and Gonzalez (2001) which was divided 
into two parts: first explicitly requiring the calculation of step 
2, and only then requiring calculation of step 3. 
Finally, it should be noted, that the accuracy 
percentage for participants in our NS group was lower than 
the average from the recent meta-analysis for natural 
frequency (~24%). It is difficult of course to make confident 
comparisons but given that we have found that the nested sets 
approach works via very similar mechanisms to the natural 
frequency approach, but requires one extra step (de-
normalization), and in some versions two extra steps, and 
furthermore that we have found a unique beneficial effect of 
frequencies, some greater accuracy on natural frequency 
versions seems plausible to us. Pragmatically therefore we 
would still advocate for natural frequencies as the primary 
method for communicating Bayesian problems to the public 
where that is possible, with proportion percentages as a 
backup where it is not. 
However, unfortunately when individuals do 
encounter Bayesian problems in the real world, they are often 
in the standard probability format. Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer 
(2001) have investigated the merits of preparing individuals 
via training to convert these into natural frequency versions 
themselves when they encounter them. This however requires 
considerable training. Our findings suggest that solvers can 
do more of the work themselves than was assumed by that 
research (i.e. can de-normalize the problem themselves) and 
therefore may only need to remember fewer ‘conversion’ 
steps. This may be valuable where the brevity of the training 
is important. In fact, our findings tentatively suggest 
substantial accuracy gains may be obtained by training 
people to following two simple rules when faced with an SP 
problem: 
 
1. Imagine 100 women (or whatever unit you’re dealing 
with). 
2. Imagine the percentages you’ve been given as 
proportions of these 100 women. 
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